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Abstract
This article studies the attempts made during World War I to imagine and build 
post-war Baltic Sea region with German-friendly Sweden as its leading power. 
Ideas to that effect were formulated and propagated in a transnational cooper-
ation (what I call “the activist movement”) taking place in wartime Stockholm 
and Berlin. The activist circles included German, Swedish, Finnish and Esto-
nian nationalist region-builders who were drawing on Sweden’s seventeenth-
century legacy as a historical great power, as well as the geopolitical fears and 
hopes associated with its geographical position. In the article, I will outline the 
main features of activist thinking that make it, at least in my opinion, a trans-
national movement, and give an overview of the three different branches of the 
movement and their political aims. I will also bring a few more concrete case 
studies as examples of how such plans played out.
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As World War I began, the stability of the then-current international system 
was immediately put into question. It was recognized in many politically 
interested quarters that the great-power conflict not only threatened Europe 
with immense destruction but also promised unprecedented changes in 
its political landscape. The exact nature of these changes, of course, was 
a matter of debate, which meant that parallel to successes and failures on 
the battlefield, visions of the post-war appeared as subjects of negotiation 
in diplomacy and propaganda. Plans for some kind of new Europe were 
included in war aims of the belligerents, discussed in privacy, furthered by 
secret agents and published in pamphlets and newspapers. Not unexpect-
edly, even most unorthodox visions of future geopolitical reconfiguration 
could thereby gain some political currency.
Naturally, there was much variation in what different groups were hop-
ing for. In ruling circles of belligerent multinational empires, the prospect 
of redrawing state boundaries and creating new lines of influence fueled 
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imperialist ambitions of gaining control of even more resources and ter-
ritories. Amongst patriots of “oppressed peoples” – representing national 
minorities of the very same empires – the war gave rise to hopes for some 
sort of national liberation that could range from increased cultural auton-
omy to outright political independence. In addition, there were radical 
social revolutionaries who denounced the idea of national interests alto-
gether and saw the war as a chance to overthrow the system of bourgeois 
states that had caused it. And even in neutral states, “war parties” sprung 
up, eager to enter the conflagration and imagining that the war would some-
how open a path towards future glory and/or the revival of ancient might.
This article is a study of one aspect of this ephemeral wartime dream-
ing: the hopes of creating – at Russian expense – a new post-war Baltic 
Sea region with Sweden as its leading regional power. In the following, I 
will refer to this plan as new Mare Nostrum Balticum.1 Drawing on Swe-
den’s seventeenth-century legacy as a historical great power, as well as the 
geopolitical fears and hopes associated with its geographical position, the 
plans for this new region came to be negotiated in a peculiar atmosphere 
of cooperation in wartime Stockholm, in circles that included representa-
tives of empires (Central Powers, above all Germany), of separatist Rus-
sian nationalities (Finns and Estonians), as well as of Sweden’s own war 
activists. Henceforth, I will refer to this unusual cooperative effort as “the 
activist movement,” and its plans and goals as “activist regionalism.”2
In first part of the article, I will briefly outline the main features of activ-
ist thinking that make it, at least in my opinion, a transnational movement, 
1  The term Mare Nostrum Balticum (“Our Baltic Sea”) was connected to the policy of 
dominium maris baltici (“Baltic Sea domination”) of Denmark and Sweden in the 16th 
and 17th centuries, aimed at establishing political, military and economic control over 
the Baltic Sea. See e.g. Jan Glete, “Cities, state formation and the protection of trade in 
northern Europe, 1200–1700,” The dynamics of economic culture in the North Sea- and 
Baltic region, ed. by Hanno Brand and Leos Müller (Hilversum: Verloren Publishers, 
2007), 20. References to the historical concept of dominus maris baltici were often 
used by the activists. See e.g. Aleksander Kesküla’s report to the Swedish General 
Staff on 07.05.1917: Sveriges Krigsarkiv, Stockholm [henceforth KrA], Generalstaben, 
Utrikesavdelningen, E I d, vol 7, röda nummer 3275.
2  The term “activism” will be elaborated further on in this article. What I mean by 
“regionalism” has been explained in detail elsewhere, and this discussion does not need 
to be repeated here (see Mart Kuldkepp, Estonia gravitates towards Sweden: Nordic 
identity and activist regionalism in World War I (Tartu: University of Tartu Press, 2014), 
27–38). A useful working definition would be roughly “an ideology and movement aimed 
at geopolitical reterritorialization.” This means the process of imagining how present 
territorial entities could be politically divided and united in new and different ways. 
These ways are frequently imagined to be justified by historical precedent.
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and give an overview of the three different branches of the movement and 
their political aims. In the second part of the article, I will bring in the 
form of case studies some concrete examples of plans made for a post-war 
Swedish-dominated Baltic Sea region. Since going fully into detail about 
the whole movement would be impossible in a single article, the three – 
interconnected – case studies will merely illustrate the variegated forms 
this activism took among various actors from around the Baltic Rim: Ger-
man, Swedish, Finnish and Estonia.
Activism as a transnational movement
One of the more unusual characteristics of the activist movement was its 
transnational and, to some extent, trans-ideological nature. Its members 
included Swedes, Finns, Estonians and Germans, conservatives and social 
democrats, all united by their shared opposition to Russia. Even though 
the alliance between all these different groups was obviously a largely tacti-
cal one, it also included a positive regionalist component as argued below.
The cooperative nature of the movement will appear less strange when 
it is realized that in many cases, the wartime goals of empires, national and 
social revolutionaries, and neutral war activists were closely intertwined.
All belligerents, probably without an exception, attempted make use 
of separatist and revolutionary movements in enemy territory in order 
to destabilize the respective foe’s inner affairs. Such groups were secretly 
supported with arms and money, and given promises of future privileges. 
At the same time, empires also attempted to influence the neutrals, either 
with the goal of directly drawing them into the war as their allies, or at 
least of ensuring their benevolence in matters such as shipping and trade.
National and social revolutionaries, as well as the war activists of neu-
tral states, naturally tried to take advantage of the great powers’ newly 
found attention to their affairs in order to fulfill own aims of national or 
social liberation or reinvigoration. The particularities of their aims varied 
and were of course rarely fully compatible with the goals of the empires. 
If matters were kept discreet, however, it was possible to forge more or less 
stable tactical alliances between those weaker groups and the warring pow-
ers interested in supporting them.
The nationalities that hoped to gain something through cooperation 
with the enemy included, among others, the Irish, the Poles, the Czechs, 
and, not least, many of the national minorities of the Russian Empire. The 
national elites of Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians 
252 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2015, 3 (153)
and many others all adopted to some extent the hope that the war would 
weaken Russia enough to make possible greater autonomy or even full 
national independence for some or all of its subject peoples. To encourage 
this development, their emissaries turned to Russia’s enemies – above all 
Germany – for moral and monetary support, and also received it to vary-
ing degrees.3
Somewhat more unexpectedly, the representatives of Finns and Esto-
nians also courted Sweden, regarded by them as the leading state in Scan-
dinavia, known to be anti-Russian in its sympathies (best exemplified in 
the well-known prewar agitation of Sven Hedin and others),4 and supposed 
to be interested in regaining the territories lost during previous centuries 
– certainly Finland, lost in 1809, but perhaps also the Baltic Sea provinces 
lost through the Treaty of Nystad, 1721. Therefore, even though Sweden had 
declared itself neutral together with the other two Scandinavian states at 
the outset of the war, certain representatives of its eastern neighbors still 
hoped that with the help of Germans and pro-war activist Swedes, Sweden 
could be encouraged to join the war against Russia.
This shows that tactical alliances mentioned above did not only exist 
between revolutionaries, separatists and neutral war activists on one, and 
belligerent empires, on the other hand, but alliances could be tied between 
non-imperial groups themselves, especially if one of them was a stronger 
and more dominant one (in this case Sweden). Put differently, the same 
mutual opportunism found in e.g. the German General Staff’s relations 
with Indian and Irish nationalists, brought together by common anti-Brit-
ish interests, was characteristic of the relations between Swedish, Finnish 
and Estonian nationalists inside the larger activist movement. The same 
Swedish activists, in turn, were a non-dominant partner in their relations 
with Germany, while the representatives of Finns and Estonians naturally 
also had their own direct contacts with Germany. In this way, a network-
like structure of tactical alliances emerged between the different groups.
At the same time, the regionalist dream of the new Swedish Mare Nos-
trum Balticum was something that seems to have transcended purely tacti-
cal concerns and been genuinely shared across the whole movement – even 
3  On the various Russian nationalities turning to Germany for support, see Seppo 
Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918: ein Beitrag zu Deutschlands 
antirussischem Propagandakrieg unter den Fremdvölkern Russlands im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Suomen Historiallisen Seura: Helsinki, 1978), 15–41.
4  About the anti-Russian agitation in Sweden in years before the war, see Gunnar 
Åselius, The “Russian menace” to Sweden: the belief system of a small power security elite 
in the age of imperialism (Almqvist & Wicksell International: Stockholm, 1994), 256–259.
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if its German, Swedish, Finnish and Estonian variants differed in their 
particularities. The vision of the post-war Baltic Sea region led by Sweden 
was therefore not simply a Swedish imperialist project, meant to extend 
Swedish hegemony (with German support) at the expense of Russia, but 
it was also a project of national liberation for Finnish and Estonian activ-
ists. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, activist regionalism can be seen as 
an example of a “pooling of nationalisms,” i.e. a regionalist construction 
building on certain shared features of all of the three national discourses 
represented in the movement.5
The three national branches of the Activist movement – and 
Germany
As perhaps already evident from previous discussion, my use of the term 
“activism” is historical. It is derived from contemporary World War I usage 
in Finland and Sweden where it was employed to designate radical patri-
otic circles known for their German-friendliness, opposition to Russia and 
inclination for the “active” way of doing politics.
In Finland, the term was originally used to refer to the covert move-
ment which developed from the turn of the century onwards with the 
goal of organizing active resistance to Russification policies in Finland (as 
opposed to the “passive resistance” promoted by other groups). Its members 
were recruited mostly from the Swedish-speaking upper class and student 
circles in Helsinki. Early on, it also employed international contacts to a 
significant degree, as its leaders (above all Konni Zilliacus) attempted to 
establish tactical alliances with other enemies of the Russian state. These 
included Russian revolutionary parties, Japan during the Russo-Japanese 
war, and even Sweden, the previous ruler of Finland, expected to entertain 
revanchist feelings towards Russia.6
5  Kuldkepp, Estonia gravitates towards Sweden, 33.
6  On the Finnish activists’ contacts with Russian revolutionaries and Japan, see e.g. 
Antti Kujala, “The Russian revolutionary movement and the Finnish opposition, 1905,” 
Scandinavian Journal of History, 5 (1980), 257–275; Antti Kujala, “The Japanese General 
Staff and the issue of the concerted anti-government action in the Russian Empire in 
1904–5,” The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: World War Zero, ed. by John W. 
Steinberg et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 261–280 and Michael Futrell, Northern underground: 
episodes of Russian revolutionary transport and communications through Scandinavia 
and Finland, 1863–1917 (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1963), 51–84. The Finnish activists’ 
attempts to incite the Swedish General Staff to anti-Russian military action during the 
Russo-Japanese War are (to my knowledge) only described in a letter from Jonas Castrén 
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During World War I, a second wave of Finnish activism came into being 
with the goal of taking advantage of this new window of opportunity in 
order to achieve Finland’s liberation from Russia. For this purpose, help 
was sought from Sweden and Germany, with a preference towards joint 
military action of both. As a way of thanks, Finnish activists expected Fin-
land to enter into some sort of a close political relationship (federation or 
confederation) with German-friendly Sweden after the war. This relation-
ship would have included common Swedish-Finnish military forces and 
common foreign policy, with Sweden given the leading role.7
Permanent Finnish offices in Stockholm and Berlin, led by Herman 
Gummerus and Fritz Wetterhoff respectively, were established almost at 
the outset of the war.8 Cooperation with Swedish activists was also of early 
origin. Although this shared effort looked promising in the beginning – and 
persisted until the fall of the Tsarist Russia – the relations became strained 
rather quickly. In addition to different takes on the ultimate regionalist 
aims of the movement (see below), probably the most important underly-
ing cause was the lack of anything approaching mass support for activism 
in Sweden. This tied the hands of Swedish activists that could not provide 
the support the Finns were asking for. As a result, Finns turned increas-
ingly directly to Germany, even if they never wholly gave up the hope of 
Swedish engagement. German help they also received, most importantly 
in the form of the establishment of a Finnish national battalion in the Ger-
man army: the Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion 27 (Königlich Preussisches 
Jägerbattalion Nr. 27). An extensive smuggling of Finnish volunteers from 
Finland through Sweden to Germany began in 1915, with passive approval 
of Swedish authorities.9
to Harald Sohlman from August 1914: Kungliga Biblioteket, Stockholm [henceforth KB], 
Gösta Mittag-Lefflers papper, L62:13: Castrén to Sohlman [undated] 08.1914.
7  On the second wave of Finnish activism more generally, see e.g. Lauri Hyvämäki, 
“Kommunismi ja jälkiaktivismi,” Suomalainen Suomi, 5 (1958), 277–278; as well as 
Matti Lauerma, “Aktivisternas linje,” Finlands utrikespolitik 1809–1966, ed. by Ilkka 
Hakalehto (Stockholm: Prisma, 1968), 40–56. The regionalist plans of the activists are 
cursorily described in L. Torbjörn Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and the Russian 
menace,” Contact or isolation? Soviet-Western relations in the interwar period, ed. by John 
Hiden and Aleksander Loit, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia 8 (Stockholm: University 
of Stockholm, 1991), 339–340.
8  For personal memoirs of Finnish political activities in respectively Stockholm 
and Berlin, see Herman Gummerus, Jägare och aktivister: hågkomster från krigsåren 
i Stockholm och Berlin (Helsingfors: Söderström & Co Förlags Aktiebolag); and Johannes 
Sundwall, Kring Jägarbataljonen (Helsingfors: Holger Schildts Förlagsaktiebolag, 1919). 
9  The most comprehensive studies of the jaeger-movement are Matti Lauerma, 
Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 27: vaiheet ja vaikutus (Helsinki: Werner 
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Of course, even Finnish activists had problems with real political sup-
port in their homeland, which they tried to hide from Germans and Swed-
ish activists, often outright lying about the supposedly good prospects for 
an anti-Russian uprising in Finland, and the general support among the 
population for the idea of a German occupation.10
In Sweden, the term “activists” was used to refer to the circles that were 
aiming to redirect Swedish foreign policy during World War I by making it 
abandon what was regarded as shameful neutrality, and enter the war as an 
ally of Germany. This was seen by Swedish activists as the opportunity to 
liberate Finland, humiliate Russia and to reclaim Sweden’s naturally given 
leading position in Norden, in line with the historical memories of the sev-
enteenth century “Great Power Era” when Sweden had been a regional great 
power and a worthy opponent to Russia. The activists expected that liber-
ated Finland would enter some sort of a close political relationship with 
Sweden in gratitude, and perhaps also hand over the ethnically Swedish 
Åland islands to Sweden. The other Scandinavian states, Denmark, and 
Norway, were subsequently expected to be drawn into the Swedish sphere 
of influence. As a side issue, the question of the Baltic provinces’ (lost in 
1721) possible reunification with the former motherland also surfaced but 
paled in importance in comparison with the Finnish and Åland questions.11
Activists and activist-sympathizers in Sweden included several promi-
nent people, both among conservatives and right-wing social democrats. 
They were journalists, writers, politicians, academics, officers and even 
members of the royal family. As some of the more high-ranking members 
Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1966) and Matti Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 
Jääkäreiden tuntematon historia (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 2000).
10  Fritz Wetterhoff had particularly good ability to make his contacts believe he had 
strong support behind himself. See Olof Mustelin, “Fritz Wetterhoff,” Finländska 
gestalter, X: fantaster och realister: Fritz Wetterhoff, Hjalmar Gabriel von Bonsdorff, Sara 
Wacklin, Gustaf Adolf Helsingius (Ekenäs: Ekenäs Tryckeri Aktiebolags Förlag, 1974), 
12. About Finnish activists’ cooperation with Germany, see Aaro Pakaslahti, Suomen 
politiikkaa maailmansodassa I–II (Porvoo, Helsinki: WSOY, 1933, 1934); Osmo Apunen, 
Suomi keisarillisen Saksan politiikassa 1914–1915 (Helsinki: SHS, 1968).
11  For a more comprehensive overview of the regionalist aims of Swedish activism, see 
Mart Kuldkepp, “Sweden’s historical mission and World War I: a regionalist theory of 
Swedish Activism,” Scandinavian Journal of History, 39:1 (2014), 126–146 and Sverker 
Oredsson, “Stormaktsdrömmar och stridsiver. Ett tema i svensk opinionsbildning och 
politik 1910–1942,” Scandia 59:2 (1993), 257–296. There are also some glimpses of a more 
ambitious Swedish program, supposedly connected to Ludvig Douglas and the Swedish 
General Staff. Its annexionist goals included, in addition to Åland, also northern part of 
Finland as well as the Kola peninsula. See KB, Gösta Mittag-Lefflers papper, L62:50:51 
– Dagbok (27.10.1915), 144–145.
256 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2015, 3 (153)
of the movement, one could name the world-famous explorer Sven Hedin, 
the ambassador of Sweden in Germany, Arved von Taube, riksmarskalk 
Ludvig Douglas, the mathematician and millionaire Gösta Mittag-Leffler, 
the professor of political science and member of the parliament Rudolf 
Kjellén, the minister of education, K. G. Westman, and the Queen of Swe-
den, Victoria. The most active personalities in the movement, however, 
were the young conservative anti-emigration activist Adrian Molin, and 
the German-friendly social democrats Otto Järte and Yngve Larsson.12
As their best-known exposé of activist views, Järte, Molin and Larsson 
published in cooperation with some others in the summer of 1915, a long 
and controversial manifesto called Sveriges utrikespolitik i världkrigets 
belysning. In the book, they called for Sweden’s “bold involvement on the 
side of Germany” exposing their main regionalist agenda that advocated 
Swedish hegemony in all of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea region. This 
publication was followed up in 1916 by the activist journal Svensk Lösen, 
edited by writer Sven Lidman. Svensk Lösen came out until the end of the 
war and both Swedish and Finnish activists participated in it.13
Building on common anti-Russian and pro-Finnish sentiments, the 
Swedish activists cooperated with Finnish activists residing in Stockholm. 
At the same time, even though they continually asserted they were acting 
only in Swedish interests, they also collaborated with Germany, taking 
advantage of the support found in influential German political and mili-
tary circles for the idea of Sweden’s alliance with the Central Powers in a 
joint campaign against Russia. However, it should be kept in mind that 
Swedish activism never had particularly good prospects in Sweden itself. It 
lacked the support of Swedish political parties, but even more importantly 
12  For attempts to create some kind of typology of the different branches of Swedish 
activism, see Mats Kihlberg, “Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen,” Två studier i 
svensk konservatism, 1916–1922, ed. by Mats Kihlberg and Donald Söderlind (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wicksell, 1961), 11–28; Torsten Gihl, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia 
IV: 1914–1919 (Stockholm: P. A Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1951), 108–110 and Michael 
Jonas, “Activism, diplomacy and Swedish-German relations during the First World 
War,” New Global Studies, 18:1 (2014), 32–34. 
13  Otto Järte, Rudolf Kjellén, Yngve Larsson, Adrian Molin, Sveriges utrikespolitik i 
världskrigets belysning (Stockholm: Nordiska Bokhandeln, 1915). About Svensk Lösen, 
see Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 8–89. Of memoirs of Swedish 
activists, the most significant account is that of Adrian Molin: KB, Adrian Molins 
efterlämnade papper. L46:16A, “Aktivismens historia 1914–1917” (1932) [henceforth 
Molin, Aktivismens historia].
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it lacked any real support among the people in a state that was at the very 
same time becoming increasingly more democratic.14
There was also a small group of exile Estonians in Sweden, who I would 
consider part of the activist movement.15 They gathered around the self-
appointed representative of Estonians there, Aleksander Kesküla, who 
first arrived in Stockholm in the autumn of 1914 and spent most of his 
war years in Sweden.
The mainstream of Estonian nationalism had remained mostly pas-
sive in the war, for even though Estonian nationalists were opposed to the 
Russification policies of the Russian state, they knew the most likely out-
come of Russia’s defeat in the war would have been Estonia’s annexation by 
Germany. At the time, the land was still dominated by its historical Baltic-
German nobility that was markedly German-friendly, and, what is more, 
conducting active annexionist propaganda in Germany.16 In case of Ger-
man victory, Estonians could thus at most have expected a degree of cul-
tural autonomy under German protection. Much more probably, though, 
outright German rule in Estonia would have meant the enactment of Ger-
manization policies replacing those of Russification, something that was 
certainly not regarded as an improvement over the status quo.17
Aleksander Kesküla was of different opinion, believing that Russia 
would and should be defeated through the strength of its enemies and 
its own inner weaknesses. At the same time, he attempted to influence 
14  About the Swedish activists’ cooperation with Germany, see Inger Schuberth, 
Schweden und das Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg: die Aktivistenbewegung 1914–1918 
(Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1981), Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Neutralität oder Allianz: Deutschlands 
Beziehungen zu Schweden in die Anfangsjahren des ersten Weltkrieges (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wicksell, 1962) and Jonas, Activism, diplomacy and Swedish-German 
relations, 31–47. The indifferent attitude of the Swedish masses to either side in the war 
is mentioned in Gihl, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia IV, 93–94.
15  Contemporary Swedish and Danish use of the terms “Estonian activists” and 
“Estonian activism” (Estniska aktivister/estnisk aktivisme), although rare, has been 
attested in connection with Kesküla’s activities. See Kuldkepp, Estonia gravitates towards 
Sweden, 40–41.
16  I. e. propaganda meant to accomplish the annexation of the Baltic Sea Provinces 
to Germany. In many cases the émigré Baltic Germans were also advocating the 
settlement of German peasants in the Baltic Sea provinces as a way of solving the 
national question for good. About Baltic German propaganda in Germany, see e.g. 
Wilhelm Lenz, “Baltische Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg: die Broschürenlitteratur 
über die Ostseeprovinzen Russlands,” Die baltischen Provinzen Russlands zwischen den 
Revolutionen von 1905 und 1917 = The Russian Baltic Provinces between the 1905/1917 
revolutions, ed. by Andrew Ezergailis, Gert von Pistohlkors (Böhlau Verlag: Köln/Wien, 
1982), 187–204 and the references therein.
17  Kuldkepp, Estonia gravitates towards Sweden, 19–20.
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Germany in the direction of not annexing the Baltic Sea provinces outright. 
Instead, he tried to persuade the German government towards respecting 
what he called the pro-Scandinavian interests of Estonians. This meant 
that, instead of annexation, Germany would have allowed Estonia to form 
some kind of a union with German-friendly Sweden. To realize that goal, 
Sweden would have needed to be drawn into the war on the German side 
and made to occupy Finland and Estonia. For that reason, Kesküla also 
launched a similar propaganda initiative in Sweden, trying to make the 
seventeenth- century motherland of Estonians aware of its obligations and 
possibilities not only in Finland, but also in the “former Swedish Baltic 
Sea provinces.”18
Perhaps due to the fact that German- or Entente-friendliness were 
hardly more than tactical choices for Kesküla, he could be more flexible in 
his political plans than either the Finnish or Swedish activists. Initially, in 
1914–16, Kesküla tried to make Sweden join the German cause, carry out its 
historical mission of liberating Finland and Estonia, and take leadership 
in a post-war Swedish-Finnish-Estonian union. In 1917–18, as he became 
convinced that Germany would not be successful in the war, he switched 
his allegiance first to England and then to France, trying to make use of 
the interests of the Entente in order to reach similar aims.19
Another actor that was extremely important for the activist movement 
was of course Germany. Fritz Fischer has argued in his influential book 
about Germany’s war aims that the ultimate cause of the war was Ger-
many’s ambition as a young revisionist power to attain for itself a worthy 
status in “world politics,” especially by challenging the British naval hege-
mony, which had made Great Britain the greatest colonial power of the 
period.20 At the same time, as e.g. pointed out by Jeremy Black, it would be 
a mistake to see the German bid for power as somehow unique.21 Smaller 
18  Even if not very explicitly, this program is already outlined in Kesküla’s first letter 
to the German government from September 10, 1914: Kesküla to German government 
10.09.1914: Berlin, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts [henceforth PAAA], R 20983, 
p. 113. See also Kuldkepp, Estonia gravitates towards Sweden, 20.
19  For a short overview of Kesküla’s political biography during the war, see e.g. Olavi 
Arens, “Aleksander Kesküla,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised: ühiskonnateadused, 
40:1 (1991), 30–34 and Kuldkepp, Estonia gravitates towards Sweden, 20–25. About 
Kesküla’s contacts with Germany, see Kaido Jaanson, “Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja 
Berliin: avang (september 1914 – mai 1915),” Tuna, 1 (2004), 12–38.
20  Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen 
Deutschland 1914/18. Dritte, verbesserte Auflage (Droste Verlag: Düsseldorf, 1964).
21  Jeremy Black, Great powers and the quest for hegemony: the world order since 1500 
(Routledge: New York, 2008), 117.
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countries, such as Serbia, could be just as guilty of territorial and political 
expansionism; and other great powers, such as Britain and France, were 
more than ready to go after the spoils of collapsing enemy empires, as the 
aftermath of World War I would later show.
This hegemonic ambition, often leading to wishful thinking and stra-
tegic overreach also prepared Germany for extensive use of tactical coop-
eration with “enemies of their enemy” for subversive and political purpos-
es.22 Among others, Germany actively cooperated with all three national 
branches of the activist movement. While the relationship between the Ger-
man minister in Stockholm, Hellmuth Lucius von Stoedten, and the activ-
ists was often less than ideal, the activists also had high-ranking friends 
and supporters in Berlin who they frequently visited and conferred with. 
These included Vice State Secretary Arthur Zimmermann in the Foreign 
Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and Rudolf Nadolny (later replaced by Dietrich 
von Hülsen), head of the so-called Sektion Politik of the German General 
Staff (Stellvertretende Generalstab).23
All the same, wartime Germany should not be seen as a uniform entity 
with a clear line of policy and stable war aims. In many questions, the situ-
ation was the opposite – not least concerning the question of how the war 
could be won. When German hopes for a short war and an easy victory 
had waned by 1915, it became a pressing issue for the country’s leadership 
to decide whether the main German efforts in the two-front war should be 
directed at the West or the East. This, in turn, raised the issue of whether 
separate peace should be sought with Russia, an idea that found consider-
able support not least from Auswärtiges Amt and Chancellor Bethmann 
Hollweg. To prevent this from happening was, of course, of crucial impor-
tance to the activists, who all – Swedes, Finns, and Estonians – did what 
they could to urge for more attention to the Eastern Front.24
22  Concerning the German policy of supporting (often in a very haphazard fashion) 
all manner of adventurers and self-appointed representatives of Russian national 
minorities, see Georgi Katkov, “German political intervention in Russia during World 
War I,” Revolutionary Russia, ed. by Richard Pipes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), 80–112.
23  About the Swedish activists’ conflict with Lucius, see Schuberth, Schweden und das 
Deutsche Reich in Ersten Weltkrieg. About the activists’ frequent trips to Berlin, see Jonas, 
Activism, diplomacy and Swedish-German relations, 38–39. About the main German 
actors involved both in the Revolutionierungspolitik against Russia (most of whom were 
also connected to the question of Swedish involvement), see Zetterberg, Die Liga der 
Fremdvölker Russlands, 49–50.
24  About the German dilemma in 1915 as to where to direct their war effort, see Fischer, 
Griff nach der Weltmacht, 223–246 and Carlgren, Neutralität oder Allianz, 81–93.
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Was the solution to this question be favorable to activists (which it ulti-
mately was), there would have been another issue coming up: German ter-
ritorial gains in the East. Especially in the second half of the war, a sharp 
conflict of views in this question emerged between the markedly chau-
vinist and pro-annexionist General Staff and the Supreme Command,25 
which were receptive to Pan-German and Baltic German propaganda 
and expected to conquer the areas on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea 
outright, and the more liberally oriented government and parliament 
(Reichsregierung and Reichstag), which, instead of outright annexations, 
supported the founding of a belt of German-friendly satellite states. Even-
tually, it was the first and more aggressive perspective that won out, even 
as Germany itself was being increasingly worn down by the material and 
human costs of the war.26
It is important to realize that unlike in the separate peace question, 
where all the activist branches took a similar stance, the differing German 
perspectives in the Eastern question were the cause of an important wedge 
in the activist movement. For the Estonian activist project, the probably less 
likely solution with a belt of German-friendly states was clearly the prefer-
able one, as it would have made possible the desired closer association with 
Sweden. For most of Swedish and Finnish activists, however, the Estonian 
national issue was marginal enough that they were prepared to support a 
more radical German annexionist program (even the OHL and the Gen-
eral Staff were ready to make an exception to Finland). Yet, in either case, 
the enlistment of Sweden on the German side was a condicio sine qua non.27
In Germany, the question of whether an alliance with Sweden should 
be attempted depended most often probably on the more general attitudes 
towards the Eastern question. Opinions were again split with OHL being 
25  Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL, led by generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
26  The conflicting German policies in the Estonian (and more generally, the Baltic) 
question, especially during the second part of the war, are treated in Karl-Heinz Janßen, 
“Die baltische Okkupationspolitik des Deutschen Reiches,” 217–254, Von den baltischen 
Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten, ed. by Jürgen von Hehn, Hans von Rimscha, 
Hellmuth Weiss (Marburg/Lahn: Herder-Institut, 1971), and Arved von Taube, “Das 
Auswärtige Amt und die estnische Frage 1917/1918,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 
4 (1969), 542–580.
27  Both Swedish and (especially) Finnish activists also cooperated with annexionist 
Baltic Germans. See especially the voluminous correspondence between Fritz Wetterhoff 
and various Baltic German politicians in the volumes Baltian maita koskevaa I and II 
in Suomen Kansallisarkisto, Helsinki, [henceforth KA], Wetterhoffin toimisto – Die 
finnl. Kanzelei, vol 15-16. Some Baltic German propaganda materials are also found 
among the papers of Adrian Molin: KB, Adrian Molins efterlämnade papper, L46:25 
(“Estniska frågan”).
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in favor of the alliance, Auswärtiges Amt mostly against, or at least skep-
tical, and Kaiser Wilhelm II on the fence and open to influence in either 
direction. At the same time, Auswärtiges Amt itself was divided, with the 
State Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow against the idea, but Vice State Secre-
tary (and von Jagow’s later successor) Arthur Zimmermann enthusiasti-
cally for it. Similarly, the German minister to Sweden at the outset of war, 
Franz von Reichenau, supported the idea indeed too intensely for Swedish 
comfort, bringing thereby about his own replacement by Hellmuth Lucius 
von Stoedten, a known advocate of Russian-German separate peace and a 
sworn enemy of Swedish activism.28
But the differences of opinion should not be overemphasized, and even 
supporters of the separate peace could consider the activist solution a pos-
sible alternative. For example, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, one of the 
main advocates of the separate peace, expressed in June 1915 as his opin-
ion that German annexation of not only Courland but also of Riga and the 
whole of Baltikum could possibly still be achieved, but not without alliance 
with Sweden and the liberation of Finland from Russia.29 Therefore, Ger-
man alliance with Sweden and German annexionism in the East could be 
regarded as complementary standpoints, jointly forming a political alter-
native to the prospect of separate peace.
Even if Germany had adopted a fully pro-activist policy, however, there 
would still have remained the question of how much it would concede to 
Sweden in return for its participation in the war. Again, there seem to 
have been two major possibilities. The Swedish activists themselves gen-
erally expected Sweden to receive hegemony over the Åland Islands and 
to enter some sort of a close post-war political relationship with liberated 
Finland, thereby cementing the status of Sweden as the leading power 
in Scandinavia. This plan had the advantage that it was compatible even 
with an annexionist German policy in the East. Another and more ambi-
tious scenario, which also aimed for Swedish influence over the Baltic Sea 
provinces (especially Estonia) was on the other hand not compatible with 
the German annexionism and was, therefore, less likely to succeed. Also, 
28  See Jonas, Activism, diplomacy and Swedish-German relations, 34–35 and Schuberth, 
Schweden und das Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg. To explain in detail the reasons 
behind the different groupings’ and individuals’ attitudes lies outside the scope of the 
present article. Not infrequently, the ultimate explanation might simply be personal 
preference or temperament.
29  Bethmann Hollweg to Falkenhayn 14.06.1915. Quoted in Fritz Fischer, Griff nach 
der Weltmacht, 239. 
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as its major proponents it only had the tiny Estonian branch of the activ-
ist movement and was therefore probably even less likely to be realized.
Both variants of activist regionalism seem to have had their proponents 
in Germany, although without further research, it is difficult to trace the 
degree of support they had, and how the German attitudes evolved and 
fluctuated over time until its defeat in World War I and the simultaneous 
disintegration of the activist movement. However, the following three case 
studies should provide some further clues towards understanding German 
attitudes regarding Swedish hegemony and Finnish-Estonian national lib-
eration, as well as the goals and activities of the three national branches of 
the activist movement itself.
The case of Wilhelm Ostwald
My first case study concerns Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), Baltic German 
laureate of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry (1909). He was born in Riga, pre-
sent-day Latvia but worked at the University of Tartu between 1872 and 
1881, and at Riga Polytechnicum from 1881–87. When he was awarded the 
Nobel price, he had already moved to Germany and was working at the 
University of Leipzig.
Between 1911 and 1915, Ostwald was active as the president of The Mon-
ist League (Deutscher Monisten-Bund). It was a philosophical and scientific 
organization founded in Jena in 1906 by German zoologist Ernst Haeckel, 
with the aim of promoting liberal values such as free thought and scien-
tific study of nature and society. The ultimate goal of the monists was to 
unite different areas of knowledge into a single meaningful totality, lead-
ing to progress in all areas of life. At the same time, monism was not far 
removed from social Darwinism, presuming that a society organized in 
a rational way would be hierarchical, led by an elite who would, if neces-
sary, employ eugenics and forceful euthanasia. Not merely a philosophical 
stance, monism thus functioned as a potent foundation for political and 
social movements – and even spiritual ones (somewhat paradoxical, given 
its atheist disposition).30
In Ostwald’s case, the monist idea of unity of knowledge was closely 
connected to his own idiosyncratic system of “energetics” (Energetik). 
30  See e.g. Daniel Gasman, The scientific origins of national socialism (second edition: 
New Brunswick/New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 48; Todd H. Weir, “The 
riddles of monism: an introductory essay,” Monism: science, philosophy, religion, and the 
history of a worldview, ed. By Todd H. Weir (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 1–44.
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Whereas Haeckel had believed the central framework of progress to be 
biological evolution, Ostwald understood reality in all its different aspects 
as manifestations of “energy.” This meant that different phenomena could 
be hierarchically ranked by their level of “organization of energy,” moti-
vated by his categorical imperative of monist ethics: “utilize energy, do not 
waste it.” This ideal naturally extended even to international politics. In 
May 1911, Ostwald preached to the Monist World Congress in Hamburg 
his idea of monism as a key to “world organization:” a solution to all of 
world’s problems.31
However, Ostwald’s energeticist progress ideals received a serious blow 
when World War I broke out and even internationally-minded academics 
were forced to take sides in the conflict. As a result, the monist movement 
was split into a pacifist and a warlike wing, with former pacifists Haeckel 
and Ostwald as leaders of the latter camp, trying to unite the monist vision 
of the rational world order with the idea of German leadership.32
On 6 October 1914 Ostwald held in Hamburg for a local Monist organi-
zation two related speeches titled respectively “Europe under German lead-
ership” and “[Germany’s] inner reorganization.” In the former, he stated 
openly that “if the European peoples cannot be brought to peace by rational 
agreement, they can be brought to it by force, which Germany would be 
able to do after the victoriously concluded war.”33 Writing in his Monist 
journal Monistische Sonntagspredigten under the title “The European bal-
ance,” he adds that “the future brain of Europe can only be Germany, since 
only Germany has fully understood the meaning of the cultural notion of 
organization and has started translating it into reality.”34
While claiming the cultural superiority of Germany, Ostwald also 
complained about Great Britain and France betraying “culture” by join-
ing Russia. Already in the beginning of September, he had signed with 92 
31  Weir, “The riddles of monism,” 6–7.
32  Ibid., 7.
33  Wilhelm Ostwald, “Europa unter deutscher Führung,” Mitteilungen der Wilhelm-
Ostwald-Gesellschaft zu Großbothen, 3 (2002), 22.
34  Wilhelm Ostwald, “Europäisches Gleichgewicht (Kriegspredigt),” Monistische 
Sonntagspredigten, 5. Reihe (1916), 304. About Ostwald‘s monist views, see Kocku von 
Stuckrad, The scientification of religion (Boston/Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 80–87. 
His activities at the outbreak of World War I are also touched upon in “Ostwald vor 100 
Jahren. 1914,” <http://www.wilhelm-ostwald.de/seiten/s14.htm> [accessed 06.03.2015]. 
The two Hamburg lectures have been published in Wilhelm Ostwald, “Europa unter 
deutscher Führung,” Monistische Sonntagspredigten, 5. Reihe (1916), 161–192, as well 
as Wilhelm Ostwald, “Europa unter deutscher Führung,” Mitteilungen der Wilhelm-
Ostwald-Gesellschaft zu Großbothen, 3 (2002), 13–23, and Wilhelm Ostwald, “Innere 
Neugestaltung,” Monistische Sonntagspredigten, 5. Reihe (1916), 209–224.
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other German academics the well-known manifesto Aufruf an die Kul-
turwelt, directed against “English webs of lies.”35 Establishing an organi-
zation of intellectuals on the basis of this manifesto became subsequently 
the pretext for his journey to Sweden, which Ostwald offered to undertake 
to Auswärtiges Amt and Zimmermann in order to “work, in the spirit of 
scientific internationalism, for a better-justified judgment of Germans.”36 
Most probably, his real aim was different, and consisted above all in mak-
ing regionalist propaganda, doubtlessly inspired by the recent German suc-
cesses on the Eastern Front, where Germany had scored a major victory 
against Russia in the Battle of Tannenberg in late August 1914.
At the time being, there is no known source that outlines Ostwald’s 
ideas in the form that he presented them for Zimmermann. Wilhelm M. 
Carlgren notes that the project of a Nordic federation under Swedish lead-
ership, the essence of Ostwald’s propaganda in Sweden, would not appear 
with clarity in German documents until next year.37 However, there are 
clues also in several more contemporary sources, which can be used to try 
to reconstruct the outline of Ostwald’s main ideas in October 1914.
Most importantly, there is the long and detailed report that Ostwald 
wrote to Zimmermann after his return, listing his Swedish contacts and 
outlining all politically significant conversations – among others with the 
German minister Franz von Reichenau, his chemist friend Svante Arrhe-
nius, Riksantikvarie Oscar Montelius, the artist Richard Berg, the Estonian 
politician Aleksander Kesküla and the leader of Swedish social democrats 
Hjalmar Branting.38 To them, Ostwald argued that the outcome of the war 
would be a new “organization” of Europe, meaning that Germany would 
become the central power ruling the whole of Europe through its allies. 
One of those would be a “Baltic Federation,” consisting of Sweden, Den-
mark, Norway, Finland and “Baltia” (meaning the Baltic Sea provinces of 
Estonia, Livonia and Courland) with Sweden as the leading power and the 
35  Ostwald also took contact with the German General Staff, offering his services in 
the field of chemistry, which, however, were rejected. See Karl Hansel, “Ostwald als 
‘intellektueller Kriegsfreiwilliger’,” Mitteilungen der Wilhelm-Ostwald-Gesellschaft 
zu Großbothen, 3 (2002), 25–26. For a further example of Ostwald‘s “anti-Barbarian” 
rhetoric, see Wilhelm Ostwald, “Die Forderung des Tages (Kriegspredigt),” Monistische 
Sonntagspredigten. 5. Reihe, 1916, 159. The Aufruf has been treated in Jürgen von Ungern-
Sternberg, Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf “An die Kulturwelt”: das Manifest 
der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1996).
36  Hansel, “Ostwald als ’intellektueller Kriegsfreiwilliger,’” 25–26.
37  Carlgren, Neutralität oder Allianz, 62.
38  Ostwald to Zimmermann 03.11.1914: PAAA, R 20984, pp. 58–99.
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King of Sweden as the Emperor. This Baltic Federation would ensure a bet-
ter economic development for its members and act as a European bulwark 
against Russia. It might even be augmented with a liberated Ukraine, mak-
ing the conglomerate stretch down to the Black Sea. The practical steps in 
the creation of this federation would have included Sweden entering the war 
on the German side and re-conquering Finland and “Baltia” which would 
then have become independent states ruled by Scandinavian princes. Den-
mark would then be persuaded to join the federation through the promise 
of Prussia returning Northern Schleswig to them.39
Most of Ostwald’s contacts in Sweden reacted to these ideas rather with 
fear and confusion than with enthusiasm. Almost the only person besides 
Kesküla to agree with Ostwald on these points was the famous Swedish 
mathematician and eminent activist Gösta Mittag-Leffler who invited Ost-
wald over to lunch on 25 October 1914, shortly after his arrival in Sweden. 
As Mittag-Leffler records in his diary, Ostwald was proposing basically 
the same plan that Mittag-Leffler himself had been supporting since ear-
lier: the creation of a Scandinavian State consisting of Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland, with King of Sweden as the Emperor (Kejsare). The 
only differences from Mittag-Leffler’s plan were that Ostwald and Zim-
mermann had augmented this imaginary state with three great duchies 
(storfurstendöme): Estland, Lifland and Kurland; and had also stipulated 
that Northern Schleswig would be returned to Denmark.40
Before leaving Sweden without having achieved much, Ostwald man-
aged to make an unfortunate public relations mistake. An interview with 
him, leaving a rather chauvinistic impression, was published in the lib-
eral newspaper Dagens Nyheter on 28 October 1914.41 There, Ostwald was 
reported to have argued openly that the German culture surpassed that 
of the rest of Europe, and that the war was not a war of German conquest, 
but a “war of organization:” a kind of a blessing helping Germany to con-
vey her talents to everyone else. He suggested that post-war, there would 
be a complete rearrangement of the map of Europe. Instead of a conglom-
erate of absolutely equal states – an idea that England had been using to its 
own advantage – Europe would be re-arranged into an organized whole 
in which every European nation (except for Russia, which according to 
39  Interestingly, the return of Northern Schleswig to Denmark indeed took place after 
the war, even if under very different circumstances.
40  KB, Gösta Mittag-Lefflers papper, Dagbok 50:49 (25.10.1914).
41  “Det kulturella Tysklands sändebud. Ett samtal med Wilhelm Ostwald. En tysk 
fredsvän om världsläget,” Dagens Nyheter, 28.10.1914. For an English summary of the 
interview, see Gasman, The scientific origins of national socialism, 140–142.
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Ostwald belonged to Asia) would be assigned a special role and position, 
with leadership belonging to Germany, and – in Germany – to the Kai-
ser. Whether the other states desired such a political union with Germany 
or not, Ostwald insisted that they would be compelled to participate.42 
For Sweden, this would mean Germany as a central power, allied with a 
“Baltic Federation” (Baltiska statsförbund) led by Sweden but also includ-
ing “autonomous Finland” and “self-governing Baltic Sea Provinces” that 
would build a buffer zone against Russia. What is more, Ostwald claimed 
that his stay in Sweden, propagating these views, had the character of an 
official mission from Auswärtiges Amt.
The interview in Dagens Nyheter caused a minor outcry both in Swe-
den and Germany.43 Deutsche Tageszeitung (6 November 1914) tried to 
assure the “Swedish friends” that Ostwald was in Sweden “certainly not” 
on “a quasi-official diplomatic mission,” as had been stated in the inter-
view, and thought it necessary that the German government publish an 
official statement to disavow any such insinuations. It even argued that “a 
sort of border control” should be instituted in time of war, in order to keep 
away from neutral countries such guests, who lack everything necessary 
to influence the public opinion in a “politically sensitive, appropriate and 
advantageous” way. 44 Similar articles followed in other newspapers. As a 
reaction to the scandal, Auswärtiges Amt admitted that Ostwald’s trip had 
been undertaken with their knowledge, and Ostwald was somewhat jus-
tified in his feeling that he was on a quasi-official mission. However, they 
also said that Ostwald’s statements had been misreported in the press and 
he had not been actually entrusted with any official mission.45
This, however, does not mean that German authorities actually had 
nothing to do with Ostwald’s project. Most likely, he was conducting his 
propaganda at least with their tacit approval, even if not outright following 
42  According to Ostwald himself, the interview was “written in a thoroughly hostile tone” 
and the journalist “fights [...] with hands and feet against the realization of the idea of 
the Baltic Federation.” See: Ostwald to Zimmermann 03.11.1914: PAAA, R 20984, 73–74.
43  See Dagens Nyheter’s answer the next day: “Världens organizerande. Ett vänligt 
projekt som icke lockar Sverge,” Dagens Nyheter 29.10.1914. In a letter from 29.10.1914 
to his German publisher, Svante Arrhenius wrote that “the good Swedes listened to 
Ostwald’s Evangelium with laughter” and “Ostwald achieved perhaps the opposite of 
what he intended” (quoted in Hansel, Ostwald als “intellektueller Kriegsfreiwilliger,” 
29). The German press controversy is treated at some length in Hansel, Ostwald als 
“intellektueller Kriegsfreiwilliger,” 32–45.
44  The newspaper article in question is republished in Hansel, Ostwald als “intellektueller 
Kriegsfreiwilliger,” 28–29.
45  Ibid., 37–38.
267Mart Kuldkepp: Hegemony and liberation in World War I
their orders. It seems that a similar plan to Ostwald’s was also presented to 
Victoria, Queen of Sweden, during her talks with von Jagow at the end of 
November 1914.46 Certainly, it was the same proposal that was brought up 
in May 1915 when Swedish Prime Minister Hjalmar Hammarskjöld visited 
Berlin for unofficial talks with German Vice State Secretary Arthur Zim-
mermann. As a return for a Swedish alliance with Germany in the war, 
Zimmermann promised to Hammarskjöld that Sweden would be given a 
leading role in Scandinavia, the territory of which would be enlarged with 
an autonomous Finland, autonomous Baltikum and the return of North-
Schleswig to Denmark.47
As remarked by Karl Hansel,48 Ostwald’s vision for the post-war dif-
fered only in nuances from the one proposed by a far more famous pan-
German regionalist Friedrich von Liszt, whose views were well-known also 
in Swedish.49 This does not mean that those nuances were not important. 
What makes Ostwald exceptional amongst other Pan-German-minded 
intellectuals is that he did not support the annexation of any new territo-
ries to Germany, but rather saw the war as an opportunity to institute a 
hierarchical “organization” of states proceeding from principles of unity 
and effectiveness. In this connection, he was, as far as is known to me, the 
first one to propose the idea of some kind of a Baltic federation including 
both the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic Sea provinces, forming a 
counterweight against Russia. This makes it not improbable that the ori-
gins of the more ambitious version of the activist regionalist program are 
actually found somewhere in Ostwald’s thinking.
The idea that Baltic Sea provinces would be ceded to Sweden, rather 
than to Germany, was also an important common denominator in Ost-
wald’s and Kesküla’s views. In fact, a month after Ostwald’s visit, Kesküla 
explicitly stated to the Swedish General Staff that Ostwald had been the first 
one to propose the idea of a “North-Germanic Federation,” encompassing 
46  Carlgren, Neutralität oder Allianz, 62.
47  Ibid., 96.
48  Hansel, Ostwald als “intellektueller Kriegsfreiwilliger,” 32.
49  Franz von Liszt, Ett mellaneuropeiskt statsförbund (Stockholm: C. A. V. Lundholm 
A.-B., 1914). Similar parallels could be drawn to the Mitteleuropa concepts of Friedrich 
Naumann and other contemporary German thinkers which in some cases also entered 
the public discourse about German war aims. For a handy introduction to Liszt’s and 
Naumann’s concepts, see: Bo Stråth, ”Mitteleuropa: from List to Naumann,” European 
Journal of Social Theory 11:2 (2008), 171–183. A thorough study of the history of concept 
in Germany until the end of World War II is found in Henry Meyer, Mitteleuropa in 
German thought and action (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955).
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“Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Russian Karelia and the coastal area 
along the White Sea against the border of Siberia.”50
Even though Ostwald failed as a politician, his regionalist attempts were 
not forgotten. In one of his pamphlets from 1915, the father of Swedish geo-
politics and activist Rudolf Kjellén writes that although Ostwald’s personal 
endeavor was discredited, the principles of his “organization policy,” i.e. 
the idea of a special Nordic Federation – had been accepted by the whole 
of Germany and should certainly not be ignored by Sweden either.51 Still 
in 1916, Russian newspapers gladly reminded their readers of Ostwald’s 
propaganda in Sweden as a sign of overwhelming German influence in 
this purportedly neutral country.52
Two proposals from the Pelican Club
Intensive activist agitation in Sweden began in the summer of 1915 with the 
publication of the book Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning.53 As 
pointed out by Adrian Molin, the previous winter’s proto-activist rumina-
tions around “strong” or “weak” neutrality for Sweden were thus replaced 
with a more radical question: “neutrality or not?” The reasons behind this 
shift were, according to Molin, the successes of the Hindenburg offensive in 
the east, new confidence in Sweden’s relatively and absolutely better military 
capacity than half a year earlier, as well as the belief on the part of Swed-
ish activists that a time had arrived for Sweden to make, as Molin writes 
“a contribution of decided importance for its own and Europe’s future.”54
This perceived window of opportunity in time appeared when activ-
ists became aware of German alliance proposals to Sweden, especially the 
50  KrA, Generalstaben, Utrikesavdelningen, E I d, vol 2, röda nummer 671.
51  Kjellén thought that German ”seductions” such the promises of making the king of 
Sweden the Emperor of Scandinavia ”had lost their sweetness for contemporary Swedes,” 
but nevertheless found that whether the Swedes like it or not, the post-war situation 
would make the relative isolation of smaller states from great powers no longer feasible. 
Should the Central Powers be thought victorious, it would thus make sense for Sweden 
to start preparing for its future in the German-controlled Middle Europe, and to join 
Germany already during the war in its fight ”not only for its own, but also for Sweden’s 
security.” Rudolf Kjellén, Hvadan och hvarthän? Två föreläsningar om världskrisen 
(Stockholm: Hugo Geber, 1915), 61.
52  Theodor Wennerström, Sverige i ryska pressen under världskriget (Stockholm: A. V. 
Carlsons Bokförlags-Aktiebolag, 1929), 39.
53  Järte et al, Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning.
54  Molin, Aktivismens historia, 13–14. The roots of Swedish activism leading to the 
publication of the book in question have also been treated in Kuldkepp, Sweden’s 
historical mission and World War I.
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one made by Zimmerman to Hammarskjöld in May 1915 (discussed above). 
The frenetic activity that subsequently began in Stockholm had much to 
do with the desire to support and encourage these pro-activist tendencies 
in Germany. As the activists hoped, a Swedish-German alliance would 
have resulted not only in preventing the danger of German-Russian sepa-
rate peace (activists were afraid that if Sweden remained neutral, it would 
be handed over to Russia as some sort of compensation), but also in the 
realization of the positive regionalist program of Swedish influence over 
Åland, Finland, and even North-Schleswig (which Sweden could in turn 
return to Denmark – conditionally!). According to Molin, this way, “finally 
a solid foundation would have been laid for Nordic politics under Swed-
ish leadership.”55 In other words, an opportunity was now there to carry 
out the program envisioned by Ostwald in the previous autumn, whether 
it included a “Baltia” or not.
Another factor giving further hope to the Swedish activists were the 
Finnish politicians who had begun to arrive in Stockholm, conducting their 
own propaganda for similar goals. Among the first to initiate collaboration 
with Swedish activists was the grand old man of Finnish activism, Jonas 
Castrén (at that point 65 years old), whom Molin had got to know already 
at the beginning of 1915. Castrén was advocating a similar program to that 
of Molin and other Swedes: Swedish intervention into the war on the Ger-
man side against a German guarantee of the separation of Finland from 
Russia. This would have protected both Swedish and Finnish interests in 
the east. In addition to Castrén, others from the “older generation” of Finn-
ish politicians gradually moved to Stockholm, including Adolf von Bons-
dorff, Rafael Erich, and Samuli Sario. A second group of Finnish activists 
were the younger men involved in the jaeger-movement. This group was 
led by Herman Gummerus and included Almar Fabritius, Georg Achates 
Gripenberg, Pehr Herman Norrmén and others.56
Swedish and Finnish activists had close relations, as can be seen from 
the diaries of prominent members of the network such as Gösta Mittag-
Leffler and Herman Gummerus.57 At some point in the autumn on 1915, 
these less formal contacts developed into a series of regular meetings 
between Swedish and Finnish activists, known as Pelikanklubben or the 
Pelican Club, named after the restaurant Pelikan on Södermalmstorg in 
55  Molin, Aktivismens historia, 14–20.
56  Ibid., 21–23.
57  The wartime diaries of Gösta Mittag-Leffler are preserved in KB, Gösta Mittag-
Lefflers papper, L62:50:48-58. Herman Gummerus’ diaries are located in KA, Herman 
Gummerus, vol 43.
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Stockholm where they usually took place. There were no protocols being 
kept, at least as far as I am aware, but there are hints and descriptions of 
the atmosphere of the meetings, suggesting both good-natured enthusi-
asm for the common goals as well as fierce debates about their particulars.
Alfons Paquet, the German journalist and writer who was a friend and 
supporter of the activists, writes in his unfinished novel fragment From 
November to November (Von November bis November) that the Pelican 
Club brought together all manner of people who shared a disdain of Tsar-
ist Russia: supporters of Finnish independence who would later build the 
core of the Finnish Whites in the Civil War of 1918, Finnish socialists who 
later would become the Reds of the same war, and Swedish activists who 
wanted to enter the war against Russia on German side in order to create, 
as Paquet puts it, “a romantic Nordic state” that would have also included 
Finland and the Baltic countries. In addition, there were fighters for Baltic 
independence, either bourgeois or socialist (such as Kesküla) who worked 
for the separation of their territories from the Tsarist state. And there were 
also German diplomats, journalists and agents working for the destruction 
of the Russian empire, hoping to revolutionize it from the inside, divide it 
up according to its ethnographic borders, or both. Paquet notes the activi-
ties of this heterogeneous club persisted until the Russian revolution, espe-
cially the second, Bolshevist one, brought an end to it. This was, of course, 
to be expected, since the common enemy of everybody involved, Tsarist 
Russia, was by then no more.58
According to the memoirs of Herman Gummerus, the Pelican Club 
included among its regulars almost all the Finnish activists staying in 
Stockholm, as well as Swedish activists or quasi-activists such as Otto Järte, 
Yngve Larsson, Arne and Nils Forssell, Tor Bonnier, Nils Söderqvist, Sven 
Lidman, Erland Hjärne, Nils Ahnlund, Sigfrid Siwertz and others, also 
including several higher officers. Among the regulars were also the Ger-
man journalists Friedrich Stieve (married to Yngve Larsson’s sister) and 
Roderich Stintzing (working at the German legation), in addition to the 
aforementioned Paquet. The unofficial head of the club was Helge Robert 
Söderström.59
58  Gerd Koenen, “Rom oder Moskau”: Deutschland, der Westen und die Revolutionierung 
Russlands 1914–1924 (Tübingen: Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, 2003), 182; Frankfurter 
Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Nachlass Alfons Paquet, Alfons Paquet, Von November 
bis November (1931/32), 75–80.
59  Gummerus, Jägare och aktivister, 277. About the composition of the club, see also 
Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 21–22.
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Plans for the post-war period began to be debated in the Pelican Club 
already during the early autumn on 1915.60 In February 1916, two more or 
less complete proposals for a Swedish-dominated Baltic Sea region were 
put into writing after heated discussions between Swedish and Finnish 
activists. The first of them was penned by the Swedish lawyer and special-
ist in international law, Dr. Nils Söderquist, a man with a background in 
the defense-friendly circles around the right-wing social democrat Erik 
Palmstierna.61 Söderquist himself is described by another activist-friendly 
German and visitor to the club, Stintzing, as an unusually passionate man 
dreaming of a Great-Scandinavian state, a federation between the four Nor-
dic peoples standing in close connection with the German Reich. Stintz-
ing also writes that soon after his proposal was ready, Söderquist cut ties 
with his activist friends, whom he accused of having betrayed their ideals 
in the name of lukewarm opportunism.62
Söderquist’s proposal has the form of a constitutional draft, probably 
somewhat patterned upon the constitution of the German Reich. According 
to this document, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland were 
to build an undissolvable (ouppsägbar) union, called the Nordic Federa-
tion (Nordiska Förbundet). The federation was to be governed by a council 
(Förbundsråd), consisting of the members of government of the member 
states and presided over by the king of Sweden with seat in Stockholm. In 
this role, the King would be invested with the title Emperor (Kejsare). The 
emperor was to appoint a chancellor (Förbundskansler). Foreign policy, 
diplomacy, war, and peace were supposed to be the responsibilities of these 
federal institutions (the emperor, the chancellor and the council). To make 
federal laws, there was to be a parliament (Förbundsdag) of 500 members, 
elected by all adult citizens of the federation. In the parliament, all of the 
federal languages could be used, including Finnish and Icelandic. There 
was to be a joint military under the command of the Emperor, common 
citizenship and a common flag – five golden crowns in a red field.63
There is little information about how exactly Söderquist’s draft came 
to be written and how it was received by others in the activist circle. In 
1956, Sven Lidman recalled that Söderquist had discussed its main ideas 
with him already in the autumn of 1915 (also confirmed by Palmstierna; 
60  At least according to what Sven Lidman could recall in 1956. See Kihlberg, Aktivismens 
huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 86.
61  Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 22.
62  Stintzing, Livsvandring, 70–71.
63  The draft has been published in Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 
84–86. See also Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and the Russian menace,” 339–340.
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see below), and that later on, Söderqvist had collaborated on the draft with 
eminent Finnish activists von Bonsdorff, Sario, Gummerus and especially 
Erich.64 Hand- or typewritten versions of the draft can be found among the 
preserved papers of several people connected to the movement, 65 which 
shows that it was at least reasonably widely spread.
In 1934, Finnish historian Aaro Pakaslahti mentioned Söderquist’s draft 
in his work Finnish politics in the World War (Suomen politikkaa maailman-
sodassa; Part II), eliciting a response in a review by Herman Gummerus, 
who claimed that although the authenticity of the draft cannot be ques-
tioned, it should not be regarded as “a plan created in cooperation of the 
Swedish activists with ours’ that would have had a practical meaning in 
the then-present situation.” Rather, according to Gummerus, the draft was 
“a loose fragment from the extremely varied discussions between friends, 
at a time when the whole of Europe was in motion and nothing seemed 
impossible.” Therefore, he thought that Pakaslahti should have left it in 
the archive, “to bring happiness to future researchers.”66 It is, of course, 
understandable that 18 years later, Gummerus had reservations about its 
fanciful ideas. Already a well-informed contemporary commentator – and 
not by far the least sympathetic person to the activists – Erik Palmstierna 
characterized (on 27 October 1915) the constitutional draft being written 
as “childish babble.”67
There was also a second constitutional draft from early 1916, this time 
penned by Finnish activist Rafael Erich, professor of Constitutional and 
International Law at the University of Helsinki and a future Prime Min-
ister of Finland (1920–21). It should probably be seen as a closely related 
alternative to Söderquist’s proposal, given their origin at the same time 
and in the same activist circles.68
Nevertheless, Erich’s proposal, Draft of the principles for a Federation 
Treaty (Utkast till grunder för ett Förbundsfördrag),69 differs in several ways 
from Söderquist’s. As L. Torbjörn Norman notes, there are some common 
64  Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 86.
65  E. g. KB, Otto Järtes efterlämnade papper, L78:5; KA, Fritz Wetterhoff, Vol 1.
66  Pakaslahti, Suomen politiikkaa maailmansodassa II, 38; Herman Gummerus, 
”Jägarrörelsens utrikespolitik” [review of Pakaslahti II], Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 
1 (1934), 189.
67  Erik Palmstierna, Orostid I 1914–1916: politiska dagboksanteckningar (Stockholm: 
Tidens Förlag, 1962), 138.
68  The two drafts have previously been compared in Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism 
and the Russian menace,” 339–340.
69  Erich’s draft has been published in Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and the 
Russian menace,” 345–348.
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features such as a council and a chancellor, but whereas Söderquist imag-
ined a closely-knit federation (förbundsstat), Erich aims at a confedera-
tion (statsförbund), called Confederation of the Nordic States (De Nord-
iska Rikenas Statsförbund).70 The proposed confederation was to include 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway but was dissolvable by common 
consent. Similarly to Söderquist’s proposal, King of Sweden was to be given 
the power of highest executive authority as the Federation President ( för-
bundspresident) and be made the highest commander of the joint military. 
There is, however, no mention of imperial powers. As with Söderquist’s 
proposal, there is a council and a chancellor, but no parliament, common 
citizenship or flag.
As has been pointed out by L. Torbjörn Norman, the fact that Erich (and 
other Finns?) preferred a confederation might be explained by them being 
afraid of too strong Swedish domination in a possible Scandinavian Federal 
State.71 Furthermore, it is likely that Erich’s (and perhaps also Söderqvist’s) 
draft was connected to a veritable ultimatum that Molin, dissatisfied with 
Finns’ passivity in formulating a clear post-war program, had presented 
to Castrén, Sario, Bonsdorff and Erich on 28 February 1916, demanding to 
hear the Finnish aims concerning Finland’s future after its eventual sepa-
ration from Russia.72
The Finns were, of course, unwilling to disclose such aims. Johannes 
Sundwall, active in the Finnish bureau in Berlin, and writing soon after 
the war, notes that the Finns could not let their goal “to shoot the bear” be 
obscured by discussions about “the bear skin,” and that the Finnish activ-
ists therefore carefully tried to further only certain kind of Swedish plans, 
while other tendencies were “less agreeable to us.”73 The conflict is very 
apparent also in the memoirs of Adrian Molin, who writes that instead 
of the program he had demanded, he received from Erich a lengthy P. M. 
which was politically useless on account of “its pros and cons, its on the 
one hand and on the other, its uneasy and over-scrupulous balancing.” He 
furthermore says that for him, it was the last attempt to try to seriously 
cooperate with the Finns and that after this incident, the Swedish and Finn-
ish movements went their separate ways.74 Molin also characterizes Erich 
70  Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and the Russian menace,”  340.
71  Ibid.
72  Molin, Aktivismens historia, 79.
73  Sundwall, Kring jägarbataljonen, 169–170.
74  Molin, Aktivismens historia, 80; see also Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and 
the Russian menace,” 340. Molin’s claim that the cooperation between the movements 
stopped at that point is, of course, an exaggeration.
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disparagingly as a “mild and learned man, to a large extent characterized 
by his beautiful given name Rafael.”75
The P. M. accompanying Erich’s plan is nevertheless interesting in its 
own right as it elaborates the constitutional draft in several respects and 
provides extra information, revealing e.g. that Erich did not exclude a 
gradual development towards a more federal form.76 In another and prob-
ably closely related P. M., sent to Molin already on 18 February 1916, Erich 
furthermore states that the list of the constituent territories of the future 
confederation could be amended with autonomous Iceland and Estonia, 
explicitly referring to the “Estonian people’s warm longing for indepen-
dence and intimate political connection to Sweden as well as to the other 
Nordic states.”77 In all likelihood, this relatively rare attention accorded to 
Estonia must stem from the influence of the Estonian Aleksander Kesküla.
Aleksander Kesküla’s The Estonian question and the Nordic 
question
Aleksander Kesküla (1882–1963)78 had originally made himself known as 
a social democrat and one of the most radical leaders of the 1905 Russian 
revolution in Estonia. Sought after by the Russian gendarmerie, he secretly 
75  Molin, Aktivismens historia, 22.
76  KB, Adrian Molins efterlämnade papper, L46:24K (”Finska frågan, prof Erich”), 
Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and the Russian menace,” 340.
77  KB, Adrian Molins efterlämnade papper, L46:24B.
78  Kesküla’s importance has been recognized among historians since Werner Hahlweg’s 
and Z. A. B. Zeman’s publications of German archival materials relating to German 
support for the Russian Revolution: Werner Hahlweg, Lenins Rückkehr nach Russland 
1917 (Leiden: Brill, 1957); Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the revolution in Russia 1915–1918 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958). Since then, Kesküla’s role as a mediator between 
Germans and Russian Bolsheviks has drawn attention particularly concerning the issue 
of “German money” that Lenin supposedly received from him (for an overview, see e.g. 
Alfred Erich Senn, “The Myth of German Money,” Soviet Studies 28:1 (1976), 83–90). 
A fairly comprehensive bibliography of works relating to Kesküla’s role in German 
contacts with Lenin is available in Jonathan D. Smele, The Russian Revolution and Civil 
War 1917–1921: an annotated bibliography (London: Continuum, 2003), 380–383. Of 
particular importance is the work of Michael Futrell, the only historian who managed to 
interview Kesküla while he was still alive: Futrell, Northern underground. More general 
studies over Kesküla’s career are few. A convenient, although short overview is found in 
Arens, Aleksander Kesküla. A more detailed, but also more fragmentary biography can 
be reconstructed on the basis of a multitude of articles by Kaido Jaanson (e.g. Jaanson, 
Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin; Jaanson, ”Aleksander Kesküla and Sweden 
1914–1918,” Scandia 69:2 (2003), 157–169). There is also a thorough account of Kesküla’s 
wartime role in the German-organized Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands in Zetterberg, 
Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918.
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emigrated to Germany in 1909 and soon afterwards continued to Switzer-
land. There, he continued his activities in left social democratic circles and 
was a member of the famous Arbeiterbildungsverein Eintracht.79
At some point, his time in Eintracht ended in some kind of a conflict 
with other members. Kesküla’s friend Adolf Gasser later reported that Kes-
küla spent thereafter “many sleepless, grueling nights” until finally decid-
ing that “the left socialists of the western world were simply unsuccessful 
bourgeoisie, who still hoped to succeed in another way.” Having thus freed 
himself from Bolshevism, he decided that the only way to destroy the hated 
Tsarist Empire was to learn the lesson of the Russo-Japanese war and the 
Japanese help to Finnish and Russian revolutionaries. He, too, would have 
to cooperate with western nationalists; the only force that could be seri-
ously reckoned with to accelerate the revolution in Russia.80
The outbreak of World War I was exactly the opportunity Kesküla was 
waiting for. In the beginning of September 1914, he made contact with the 
German minister in Bern, Gisbert von Rombert. To Romberg, Kesküla 
claimed to have good contacts with both Russian socialists in exile (includ-
ing the Bolsheviks in Switzerland) and Estonian separatists back home. 
According to Kesküla, Estonians were fearful of German annexation that 
would fortify the rule of the hated Baltic German nobility, and prove per-
haps even more dangerous to Estonian national endeavors than the Rus-
sian rule had been. If, on the other hand, Germany supported unification 
of Estonia with Sweden, the whole population of Estonia would rise up in 
support of German invasion, and perhaps render valuable services to the 
German army. If Germany was willing to guarantee that Estonia would 
not be annexed, Kesküla personally wished to travel to Sweden in order to 
conduct propaganda in support for Swedish alliance with Germany and 
to prepare the uprising in Estonia. Romberg, in turn, deemed it harmless 
to give Kesküla some friendly assurance which would motivate him to set 
in motion with his propaganda endeavor.81
Following this encouragement, Kesküla wrote a letter to the German 
government, more extensively outlining his political aims, and asking for 
79  Alfred Erich Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland 1914–1917 (Wisconsin, 
MI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 60. About Eintracht, see Karin Huser, 
Bildungsort, Männerhort, politischer Kampfverein. Der deutsche Arbeiterverein “Eintracht 
Zürich” (1840–1916) (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2012).
80  Adolf Gasser, “Alexander Kesküla: ein estnischer Revolutionär (1964) – Christ und 
Welt: ausgewählte historische Schriften 1933–1983 (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1983).
81  Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg 12.09.1914. PAAA, R 20983, p. 112. See also Jaanson, 
Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin, 16.
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German support for this mysterious movement, supposedly under prepa-
ration in Estonia, which had the aim of securing satisfactory national, civic 
and religious development for Estonians either through territorial reunifi-
cation with the kingdom of Sweden or some other political combination.82
It is hard to say how much straightforward support Kesküla’s Estonia-
related plans actually received from Germany. What is certain is that Ger-
man authorities quickly came to regard Kesküla as an energetic and useful 
person acting in German interests. Especially his good contacts with Rus-
sian exile social revolutionaries enabled him to play a relatively influential 
role in giving shape to the German Revolutionierungspolitik against Russia, 
eventually leading to the peace of Brest-Litovsk. In his role as a German 
agent, Kesküla could in turn use his German money, contacts, and influ-
ence to further his personal goal of Estonia’s (re-)unification with Sweden. 
In most immediate terms, this meant making propaganda for a program 
which included Sweden entering the war on the German side, participat-
ing together with Germany in a joint attack on Russia, and occupying the 
Estonian territory, thereby once again liberating the Estonian peasants 
who, as Kesküla claimed, still considered themselves “Swedish prisoners 
in Russia.”83
At the same time, Kesküla could be flexible in his aims. His “mini-
mal program” consisted simply in Estonian autonomy (in either Russia or 
Germany). His “maximal program,” as he put it in January 1915, was much 
more ambitious: “the consolidation of the Northern European cultural cir-
cles from Schleswig to Ural.”84 For Estonians with their “Great-Swedish” 
national interests, this meant cultural and political (re-)integration into 
the “Northern cultural sphere” through the creation of an independent 
Estonia as a member of a strong Nordic federation also including Finland 
(and perhaps some other territories further to the east, certainly Ingria) 
and led by Sweden. This new region was to be built on shared historical 
traditions and common security and economic interests, and would for-
ever keep Russia at a distance from Europe.85
82  Kesküla to German government 10.09.1914: PAAA, R 20983, p. 113. See also Jaanson, 
Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin, 16.
83  See Kesküla’s and Jakob Ploompuu’s memorandum to Swedish activists from the 
spring of 1916, titled An die Patrioten Schwedens. Published in Kuldkepp, Estonia 
gravitates towards Sweden, 178–182. 
84  See Kesküla’s telegram to Swedish General Staff 12.01.1915: KrA, Generalstaben, 
Utrikesavdelningen, E I d, vol 2, röda nummer 903 and his earlier report to the same 
on 01.12.1914: KrA, Generalstaben, Utrikesadvelningen, E I d, vol 2, röda nummer 671.
85  Any detailed reconstruction of the nuances and the development of Kesküla’s political 
programs is a task that has to be undertaken separately.
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Kesküla was also flexible in other ways. He changed sides several times, 
cooperated with nearly anyone whom he regarded as useful 86 and was not 
averse to twisting the truth in ways that suited him. Certainly, the par-
ticularities of his plans were adjusted as the changing times demanded.
Kesküla embarked on his first propaganda journey to Sweden already 
in the autumn of 1914, roughly at the same time with Ostwald and became 
more or less permanently based in Stockholm in the autumn of 1915. It 
was at that later point he established contacts with Swedish activists such 
as Adrian Molin, Otto Järte, K. G. Westman and Johannes Kolmodin, as 
well as the officers of the Swedish General Staff and the editors of more 
influential newspapers.87
Already in the autumn of 1914, Kesküla had met twice – in Berlin and in 
Stockholm – with Wilhelm Ostwald who, as he later claimed to the Swed-
ish General Staff, had been the originator of the idea of the Swedish-led 
Baltic Federation (see above). In a letter to Zimmermann from 13 October 
1914, Ostwald describes his first meeting with Kesküla in positive terms. 
The National-Est Kesküla had been on his way to Stockholm with the aim 
of bringing his Fatherland out of the Russian rule, and it had soon become 
apparent that Kesküla’s political ideas concerning the Baltic states88 were 
to a high degree similar to those that Ostwald had himself presented to 
Zimmermann. Kesküla had also left a very good personal impression upon 
Ostwald.89
A second meeting between the two took place on 27 October, mediated 
by and in the presence of the German minister in Stockholm Franz von 
Reichenau.90 Again, Ostwald brings up the good impression left by Kesküla, 
who he thought was seemingly free from personal ambition and only act-
ing in the interests of his nation and its cultural development.91 Ignorant 
of the extent of Kesküla’s contacts with Auswärtiges Amt, Ostwald also 
86  This included Russian Bolsheviks in exile, Estonian, Finnish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian 
and various other emigrants, the diplomats of Germany and Entente, Swedish authorities, 
American peace activists, and so on.
87  For cursory information about Kesküla’s contacts in Sweden, see Gummerus, Jägare 
och aktivister, 193.
88  The term used is baltischen Staaten, probably meaning all countries around the 
Baltic Sea.
89  Ostwald to Zimmermann 27.10.1914: PAAA, R 20984, pp. 9–10; see also Jaanson, 
Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin, 17.
90  The outline of their conversation is found in Ostwald to Zimmermann 03.11.1914: 
PAAA, R 20984, pp. 95–98.
91  Ostwald to Zimmermann 03.11.1914: PAAA, R 20984, pp. 97–98.
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recommended to Zimmermann that should the breakout of a revolution-
ary movement in Estonia be desirable, Kesküla could certainly be useful.
In short, the relationship between the two men seems to have been excel-
lent, even if Ostwald’s judgement was probably impaired by his naivety 
in political matters (as also demonstrated by his incautious interview in 
Dagens Nyheter). Kesküla in turn was certainly not averse to making use of 
Ostwald’s name. In a letter to Romberg from 6 January 1915, Kesküla writes 
about the need to sharpen the latent Swedish-Russian conflict, mention-
ing that “Professor Ostwald has not yet done anything for us” and that his 
name “must be made use of in every possible way, whether with or with-
out his participation.” “Perhaps he can receive an honorary doctorate at 
the University of Tartu,” Kesküla thought.92
Gummerus notes in his diaries that he had, probably for the first time, 
met Kesküla on 4 November 1915. Kesküla had described the situation 
in Estonia and presented his “minimal” and “maximal” programs – the 
first one implying Estonian autonomy and joint German-Swedish attack 
on Saint Petersburg; and the second one including Estonia as a member 
in a Nordic federation together with Ingria and possibly Northern Rus-
sia. Kesküla had also proposed to work jointly with Finnish and Swedish 
activists with the goal of drawing Sweden into the war. On 12 November 
1915 Gummerus and Kesküla met again. On 16 November Erich was also 
included in their discussion.93
Molin also mentions in his memoirs that he had learned to know Kes-
küla in the autumn of 1915, characterizing him as “an interesting type” and 
“a younger counterpart to Jonas Castrén.”94 Kesküla also seems to have had 
a contact with Otto Järte.95 Yet his opinion on the Swedish activists was not 
particularly high. In an interview to the Swedish General Staff on 25 Janu-
ary 1916 Kesküla complained that the activist ambition “lacked all ground-
ing in Realpolitik” and its advocates were engulfed in “romantic shimmer,” 
willing to ally themselves with Germany for Germanicism’s sake, without 
a true understanding of Sweden’s economic interests in the east, and how 
severely Sweden would be threatened by a separate peace between Russia 
and Germany without having a say in the matter.96
92  Kesküla to Romberg 06.01.1915: PAAA, R 20985, pp. 91–92.
93  KA, Herman Gummerus, vol 43 (diary entries on 04.11, 12.11 and 16.11.1915).
94  Molin considered Castrén to be “certainly a head higher than all the other Finns of 
the older generation.” Molin, Aktivismens historia, 50, 21.
95  An envelope, addressed to Järte is found in Kesküla’s file at PAAA, Bern 1324 (“Kesküla 
und Russische rev. Propaganda”), p. 248785.
96  KrA, Generalstaben, Utrikesavdelningen, E I d, vol 5, röda nummer 2055.
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Neither was Kesküla too impressed by the Finnish activists. On 21 May 
1915 Kesküla claimed to the Swedish General Staff that a joint Swedish-Ger-
man operation against Saint Petersburg across Estonia and Ingria was at 
the time in Germany regarded as preferable to the Finnish activist goal of 
Swedish intervention via Finland. This statement of his bears the remark 
of the interviewer that it should be regarded as an expression of Keskü-
la’s own Estonian-friendly political goals, implying Kesküla was trying 
to attach undeserved strategical importance to Estonia.97 In January 1918, 
after having long time ago switched sides to the Entente, Kesküla charac-
terized Finnish activists during a meeting with the Estonian nationalist 
leader Jaan Tõnisson as “scoundrels” in German service, anti-Estonian 
deep in their hearts and even secret enemies of the idea of Finnish inde-
pendence, as they supposedly feared that the rise of Estonian and Finnish 
nationalism would endanger Swedish interests.98
The best-known relation of Kesküla’s own views is the Declaration of 
Estonians, or, as it was titled in its French version, The Estonian question 
and the Nordic question.99 It was a manifesto that he submitted to the Third 
Conference of the Union of Nationalities in Lausanne in June 1916.100 Unlike 
e.g. Söderquist’s and Erich’s proposals, this document is not a constitu-
tional draft and is more akin to a propaganda pamphlet. But perhaps this 
is exactly the feature that makes it characteristic of the Estonian perspec-
tive in activism, as it stresses the forces of history, culture, and fate in tying 
Estonia to Finland and Sweden, rather than emphasizing the constitutional 
features characteristic of Söderquist’s and Erich’s proposals. After all, the 
goal of mending of historical and cultural unity between Sweden and Fin-
land, broken little more than one hundred years ago, needed little in the 
way of apology, explanation or legitimation. Estonia was a different case.
In Kesküla’s vision, the Baltic Sea region was an ancient point of collision 
between three cultural areas (Kulturkreis): the East European cultural area 
or Russia, the Central European cultural area and the Northern European 
97  KrA, Generalstaben, Utrikesavdelningen, E I d, vol 3, röda nummer 1489.
98  Mart Kuldkepp, “Intriigid, provokatsioonid ja iseseisvuse sünd: Eesti välisdelegatsioon 
ja Aleksander Kesküla,” Ajalooline Ajakiri, 3 (2013), 338. 
99  Published as La Question Esthonienne et la Question Septentrionale: Mémoire présenté 
au nom des Esthoniens de la III conference des Nationalités, par M. Kesküla (Lausanne: 
Librairie centrale des Nationalités, 1918). The German original titled Die Deklaration 
der Esthen is found in PAAA, Bern 1324, pp. 248835–248866.
100  About this major German-financed propaganda endeavor and Kesküla’s role in 
it, see Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands, 106–144 and Kaido Jaanson, 
“Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Rahvuste Uniooni III konverents Lausanne’is 1916. 
aastal,” Akadeemia, 12 (2000), 1824–1862. 
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cultural area. The latter included Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
in the west, and Estonia and Finland as far as Karelia in the east. Estonia, 
which had historically belonged to the Northern European cultural area, 
was according to Kesküla annexed to the Central European area in the 
beginning of the thirteenth century, regained its place in the Northern 
Europe in the sixteenth century, had under the eighteenth century fallen 
under the yoke of Eastern Europe, and was now, at the time of the World 
War I, in need of liberation in order to once more regain its rightful place 
in the Northern Europe. Kesküla envisions the result of this reunification 
as a Swedish-Finnish-Estonian personal union under the Swedish king.
In his Declaration, Kesküla is engaged in a kind of a grand rhetorical 
struggle to achieve the recognition of Estonia as belonging to the same 
cultural sphere as Sweden and Finland. Its sweeping generalizations about 
Estonian and European history are at the same time a sign of the marginal-
ity of the Estonian activist movement, that, for all that it could have been, 
was exemplified mostly by Kesküla himself.
All of Kesküla’s known Estonian collaborators (or agents) – Oskar Ele-
vant, Gustav Paju, Arthur Siefeldt and others – seem to have been emigrants 
with little contact with their compatriots in Estonia. Even if there were 
instances of cooperation between Kesküla and wartime Estonian emissar-
ies to Sweden (e.g., Jakob Ploompuu), these remained isolated cases.101 Yet 
Kesküla was adamant in claiming that his “svecophilia” was not merely his 
personal conviction or fantasy102 and that the movement aiming for Esto-
nia’s reunification with Sweden actually existed. Whether and how much 
truth there was in this claim, is still to be determined by future research.
Conclusions and consequences
The First World War led to the whole or partial demise of several multi-
national empires and the appearance of many new nation-states, as well 
as the wholly unprecedented phenomenon of Communist Russia. But it is 
101  About the Ploompuu episode, see Mart Kuldkepp, “”Grundbesitzer aus Estland”: 
activist regionalism in the Baltic Sea area in 1916,” Ajalooline Ajakiri, 1/2 (2012), 137–
165. Oskar Elevant and Gustav Paju are treated in Kaido Jaanson, “Eestlased Rootsi 
salapolitsei valvsa silma all Esimese maailmasõja ajal,” Tuna, 1 (2003), 19–31; Arthur 
Siefeldt in Kaido Jaanson, “Arthur Siefeldt-Simumägi (1889–1939): ühe eestlase elu 
Eestimaata,” Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi aastaraamat 2004–2005, 181–203.
102  Kesküla to Steinwachs 03.03.1916: PAAA, Bern 1324, p. 218719; Kuldkepp, 
“Grundbesitzer aus Estland,” 143.
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not only in hindsight that the war’s geopolitical implications were under-
stood. Such possibilities were apparent already during the war itself, both 
for the belligerent empires, and the often self-appointed private politicians 
attempting to use the war for own political advantage.
What Finnish, Swedish and Estonian activists had in common, jus-
tifying the use of the same denominator for their diverse activities, were 
their basic regionalist aspirations: the dream of the demise of Russia and 
of the new rise of Greater Sweden liberating and taking leadership of its 
once-lost territories. This goal followed from common anti-Russian secu-
rity interests, historical memories of earlier Swedish-led regional consoli-
dation, and the common understanding of the war-time being a chance 
(“a window of opportunity”) of making this regionalist dream come true.
What makes activism especially interesting as a kind of regionalism 
was that it was not simply a Swedish imperialist project conjured up solely 
by Swedish conservatives. The ideas of Sweden’s historically motivated 
leadership and the geopolitical axiom of the Russian menace were shared 
across this transnational movement. Therefore, activism shows how a Bal-
tic Sea regionalism could be constructed solely on shared national ambi-
tions, subsequently taking on a transnational significance. Swedish stor-
maktsdrömmar (“great power dreams”), Finnish and Estonian ambitions 
of liberation from Russia, and certain strands in German politics all came 
together in the shared image of the future post-war Baltic Sea region, con-
solidated and led by a re-emergent and heroic Sweden.
Of course, as we have seen, the different activist plans for a new Mare 
Nostrum Balticum varied in their particularities, reflecting personal and 
perhaps ideological differences, but, what is perhaps more interesting, also 
differences in national outlooks. Estonian activism (personified in Kes-
küla) had a slightly different – more cautious, but also more opportunist 
– attitude towards Germany, and accused the movement’s Swedish and 
Finnish branches for blind trust and romantic attachment to this great 
country. Finns and Swedes in their turn could never reach the agreement 
about exactly how much of its national sovereignty (and territory) Finland 
would be prepared to hand over to Sweden after the war. Yet the core goal, 
the dream of the heroic Sweden as a worthy opponent to Russia, remained 
central to all of them.
There are all reasons not to overestimate the activists’ influence and 
the probability that their plans could have become serious political alter-
natives – the probability, furthermore, declined together with German 
military fortunes. But even if the immediate political achievements of the 
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activists were limited, the movement must have affected the subsequent 
history of Baltic-Nordic regionalism, especially as far as the Swedish atti-
tudes towards the Baltic countries were concerned. This is a topic that needs 
much more research, but just one telling example might suffice here as a 
conclusion to this article.
In January 1919, the Swedish envoyé to Paris, Albert Ehrensvärd, wrote 
to his foreign minister Johannes Hellner, that since justified doubts existed 
about the ability of Estonians and Latvians to sustain independent state-
hood, there had appeared the idea to build “a Baltic federation” (ett baltiskt 
förbund) which would include “the Scandinavian countries, Finland, Esto-
nia, Livonia and possibly Lithuania and Poland.” According to Ehrensvärd, 
it was “above all Estonians and probably also Livonians” who supported 
this idea and were now trying to win Swedish support for it by promising 
Sweden “a leading role” in this new federation.103
Some ten days later, Ehrensvärd met a representative of Latvia in Lon-
don, Henri Simson, who explained that the king of Sweden would preside 
over the federation council (förbundsrådet) bearing in this role the title of 
Emperor (kejsare). In a following report to Hellner, Ehrensvärd noted that 
“[i]t was thus professor Os[t]wald’s ideas turning up again in a different 
form” and that “[p]ersonally, Mr. Simson made a good impression, which 
I cannot say about his plans and proposals.”104
Therefore, it does not seem unlikely that the failure of activist regional-
ism in World War I to some extent also affected subsequent Swedish atti-
tudes towards trans-Baltic regional cooperation. Wilhelm M. Carlgren 
has pointed out the extent to which interwar-era Sweden avoided having 
any active foreign policy directed at the Baltic countries, even though it 
was clearly in Swedish interests to preserve the post-war status quo and 
to oppose the revisionist aims of Russia and Germany. Instead, Sweden 
displayed an extremely cautious attitude towards the more or less desper-
ate Baltic proposals for regional political and military cooperation which 
appeared some regularity until World War II and even beyond.105
103  Stockholm, Riksarkivet Marieberg [henceforth RA], UD, 1902 års dossiersystem, 
Vol 287, Ehrensvärd to Hellner 06.01.1919. About post-war attempts to create a Baltic 
League, originally intended to encompass both the Baltic and the Scandinavian states, 
see e.g. Marko Lehti, A Baltic league as a construct of the new Europe: envisioning a Baltic 
region and small state sovereignty in the aftermath of the First World War (Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang, 1999).
104  RA, UD, 1902 års dossiersystem, vol 287, Ehrensvärd to Hellner 15.01.1919.
105  Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum: från mellankrigstid till efterkrigsår: en 
översikt (Stockholm: Publica, 1993), 13.
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On the occasion of the ten-year anniversary of Estonian independence, 
the Estonian-friendly journalist Ejnar Fors Bergström wrote in an article 
that “[o]ne does not need to be in any way an activist in order to wish that 
these warm feelings [for Sweden] would find an answer from the Swedish 
side and a more general knowledge would spread itself in our country about 
the newly liberated Baltic nations which have turned their eyes towards 
Sweden.”106 It is perhaps telling that ten years after the activist movement 
had disintegrated, Bergström thought it appropriate to suggest that the 
idea of Baltic-Nordic co-operation could be divorced from the memory of 
wartime regionalist dreaming. If nothing else, it is certain that the plans 
for new Mare Nostrum Balticum had left a legacy of some kind.
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Kokkuvõte: Hegemoonia ja vabanemine Esimeses maailmasõjas: 
plaanid uue Mare Nostrum Balticum’i loomiseks
Esimese maailmasõja algus tõi praktiliselt kohe kaasa kahtlused Euroopa 
rahvusvahelise süsteemi senisel kujul püsimajäämises. Paljudes väga eri-
nevalt meelestatud poliitiliselt aktiivsetes ringkondades mõisteti kiiresti, 
et sõda ei ähvarda mitte ainult hävingu ja surmaga, vaid tõotab kaasa tuua 
ka enneolematuid muutusi poliitilises geograafias. Nende muutuste täpne 
suund jäi esialgu mõistagi lahtiseks, mis tähendas, et rööbiti edu ja eba-
eduga lahinguväljadel muutusid erinevad visioonid sõjajärgsest maailmast 
diplomaatia ja propaganda jaoks ajenditeks ja sihtmärkideks.
Käesolev artikkel uurib sõjaaegseid katseid rajada alust uuele sõja-
järgsele Läänemere regioonile, mille juhtivaks poliitiliseks võimuks oleks 
pidanud saama Saksa-sõbralik Rootsi. Taoliste plaanide välja töötamine 
106  Ejnar Fors Bergström, “En nordisk republik: till tioårsminnet av Estlands 
självständighet,” Göteborgs-Posten, 25.02.1928.
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ja nende heaks propaganda tegemine leidis aset rahvusüleses koostöös (nn 
aktivistlikus liikumises) sõjaaegses Stockholmis ja Berliinis. Sellega olid 
seotud nii Saksa ametivõimud kui ka Rootsi, Soome ja Eesti rahvuslased. 
Aktivistid toetusid oma lootustes Rootsi 17. sajandi suurvõimu-pärandile 
ning geopoliitilistele hirmudele ja lootustele, mis olid seotud Rootsi ja tema 
naaberriikide geograafilise asukohaga. Plaani teostumise vältimatu eeldus 
oli Rootsi sõttaastumine Saksamaa poolel ning Rootsi-Saksa ühispealetung 
Soome (ja ka Läänemereprovintside) vabastamiseks.
Artiklis antakse ülevaade aktivistliku mõtlemise põhijoontest ja selle 
kolme rahvusliku suuna (Rootsi, Soome ja Eesti aktivismi) eripäradest ning 
käsitletakse Saksa toetust taolistele plaanidele. Selle üldosa ilmestamiseks 
on lähemalt vaadeldud mõningaid näiteid aktivistlike kavade väljatööta-
mise ja nende heaks tehtud propaganda kohta. Tähelepanu all on Wilhelm 
Ostwaldi Rootsi-reis 1914. aasta sügisel; Rootsi ja Soome aktivistide koos-
töös nn Pelikani-klubis tehtud plaanid 1915. ja 1916. aastal ning samaaegne 
Aleksander Kesküla propaganda Eesti põhjamaisuse mõtte heaks.
Erinevad plaanid mõistagi varieerusid üksikasjades, seda tulenevalt nii 
isiklikest kui ka ideoloogilistest erimeelsustest. Peamine vastuolude põh-
jus peitus ilmselt siiski rahvuslike ambitsioonide eripärades. Eesti akti-
vistid (kes kehastusid peamiselt vaid Aleksander Kesküla isikus) suhtusid 
ettevaatlikumalt – aga ka oportunistlikumalt – Saksamaasse ning heitsid 
liikumise Rootsi ja Soome suundadele ette pimedat usaldust ja romanti-
list kiindumust selle riigi vastu. Soome ja Rootsi aktivistid omalt poolt ei 
jõudnud kuidagi kokkuleppele, kuivõrd palju oma rahvuslikust suverään-
susest (ja ka territooriumist) oleks Rootsi poolt vabastatud Soome ikkagi 
nõus Rootsile loovutama.
Peamine regionalistlik eesmärk: unistus heroilisest Rootsist kui geopo-
liitilisest vastukaalust Venemaale, oli keskse tähendusega aga kõigi akti-
vistide jaoks. Unistus uue Suur-Rootsi tõusust, mille roll olnuks tegutseda 
oma kunagiste valdusalade taasvabastaja ja sõjajärgse juhina, tulenes ühis-
test Vene-vastastest huvidest, mälestustest varasema, Rootsi poolt juhitud 
regionaalse konsolideerumise kohta ning arusaamisest, et just maailma-
sõda ja võimalus koostööks Saksamaaga kujutab endast harukordset või-
malust taoliste plaanide elluviimiseks.
Seega polnud aktivismi näol tegemist ainult Rootsi imperialistliku 
projektiga, vaid need eesmärgid olid ühised kogu transnatsionaalse liiku-
mise jaoks. Seega näitab aktivism, et Läänemere regionalism võis põhi-
neda puhtalt ühistel rahvuslikel ambitsioonidel, millele seeläbi sai omaks 
transnatsionaalne tähendus. Rootsi radikaalsete rahvuslaste unistused 
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17. sajandi suurvõimuajast, Soome ja Eesti rahvuslaste lootused Venemaa 
võimu alt vabanemiseks ning teatud osa sõjaaegsest Saksa poliitikast said 
kokku kujutluspildis tulevasest sõjajärgsest Läänemere regioonist, mis 
oleks ühendatud ja juhitud heroilise Rootsi poolt.
Kindlasti pole põhjust aktivistide mõjuvõimu üle hinnata. Tõenäosus, 
et neist plaanidest saanuks tõsiseltvõetav poliitiline alternatiiv, vähenes 
sõja venides ning Saksamaa ebaedu taustal. Ent kuigi aktivistide otsesed 
poliitilised saavutused jäid piiratuks, avaldas mälestus taolistest plaanidest 
ilmselt oma mõju Balti-Põhjamaade regionalismi järgnevale ajaloole. Eriti 
tõenäoliselt puudutas see Rootsi suhtumist noortesse Balti riikidesse, mille 
sõdadevahelise aja föderalistlikke plaane (Balti Liit) nähti mingil määral 
sõjaagse läbikukkunud aktivismi poliitilise jätkuna.
